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“One cannot review the procedural history of this case, and others like it, without concluding 
that something is amiss. Landowners watch as their property is handed over to pipeline 
companies and irreparably transformed, all without judicial consideration of the crucial 
question: Should the pipeline exist?” 
 
- Judge Griffith, Judge Katsas, & Judge Rao  
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The FERC’s history of approving nearly 100% of pipelines and divisive pipeline cases like the 
Atlantic Coast Pipeline and Mountain Valley Pipeline have driven landowners’ long-standing 
claims of regulatory agency capture of the FERC. The present research substantiates the claim of 
capture with a case study of the Mountain Valley Pipeline and uncovers that the FERC is both 
culturally and corrosively captured. This research also suggests that the capture of the FERC 
began at its conception during the natural gas crisis and subsequent natural gas bubble, which 
caused the FERC to follow the industry’s lead. These findings indicate that the FERC’s policies 
and procedures must be modified to distance it from the natural gas industry and further 
incorporate the public’s voices into its decision-making process. 
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The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the agency which approves natural 
gas pipeline proposals, rejected only two pipelines and approved 400 pipelines from 1997 to 
2017.1 The FERC’s record of approving approximately 99% of pipelines including when the 
necessity for the pipeline is contested has led many landowners to charge it with capture or when 
“regulators consistently [favor] the preferred policies of targets of regulation, resulting from an 
exercise of power by the regulated industry.”2  
While the FERC certifying approximately 99% of pipeline projects over twenty years 
suggests capture, the record alone cannot substantiate capture for several reasons.3 First,  
capture is not a dichotomy where an agency is labeled captured or uncaptured.4 Instead, a 
specific mechanism of capture must be identified to prove and remedy capture. Capture has been 
classified into two main types: 1) material capture where an industry persuades regulators using 
its resources and 2) cultural capture where the regulator is persuaded by the identity of the 
regulated industry.5,6 There is also 3) corrosive capture where the regulator “corrodes” the 
legislation’s intent, but corrosive capture does not indicate a clear mechanism of capture and 
often coexists with another form of capture.7 Regulatory capture is additionally placed along a 
 
1. Tierney, Susan, Natural Gas Pipeline Certification Policy Considerations for a Changing Industry, (New York: 
Analysis Group), 1-36. 
https://www.analysisgroup.com/uploadedfiles/content/insights/publishing/ag_ferc_natural_gas_pipeline_certificatio
n.pdf  
2. Rex, Justin, “Anatomy of agency capture: An organizational typology for diagnosing and remedying capture,” 
Regulation & Governance 14, no. 2 (2020): 273. 
3. Carpenter, Daniel, “Protection without Capture: Product Approval by a Politically Responsive, Learning 
Regulator,” American Political Science Association, (2004): 613-631. 
4. Rex, “Anatomy of agency capture,” 271-294. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Kwak, James, “Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis,” in Preventing Regulatory Capture, ed. Carpenter, 
Daniel & Moss, David, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 71-98. 
7. Carpenter, Daniel & Moss, David, “Introduction,” in Preventing Regulatory Capture, ed. Carpenter, Daniel & 
Moss, David, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 1-22. 
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dimension of strong to weak capture in a solid capture diagnosis.8 Lastly, capture cannot be 
deduced from a pro-industry record alone because there are a number of parallel forces in the 
legislature and bureaucracy. For example, an agency’s pro-industry record can be the result of 
the Executive’s influence or “electorally sanctioned pro-business governance.”9  
 
Fig. 1 - 2017 map of MVP route. Figure by Oil Change International & BOLD Alliance10 
 
Therefore, though the FERC approving approximately 99% of natural gas pipelines 
suggests capture, it is not sufficient to prove capture.11 As a result of the need to substantiate or 
debunk the popular claim of the FERC’s capture, this research assessed the capture of the FERC 
using a case-study of the Mountain Valley Pipeline (MVP). The MVP is a 303-mile natural gas 
pipeline under construction in West Virginia and Virginia (see figure 1). The MVP was selected 
 
8. Ibid. 
9. Carpenter, Daniel, “Detecting and Measuring Capture,” in Preventing Regulatory Capture, ed. Carpenter, Daniel 
& Moss, David, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 66. 
10. Oil Change International and BOLD Alliance, The Mountain Valley Pipeline: Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Briefing, (Washington, D.C: Oil Change International, 2017), 1-4, 
http://priceofoil.org/content/uploads/2017/02/mountain_valley_pipe_web_final_v1.pdf   
11. Tierney, Susan, Natural Gas Pipeline Certification Policy Considerations for a Changing Industry, (New York: 





for several reasons including its in limbo status with pending federal authorizations, its 
substantial record with the FERC, and its location in the Appalachian region which has been 
disproportionately affected by energy interests. Current FERC Chairman Glick’s comments in 
dissents on the FERC’s MVP decisions have also indicated an understanding of why landowners 
see the FERC as a rubber stamp for the industry, making the MVP ripe for study.12 In applying a 
case study approach to the MVP’s path to approval and interviewing stakeholders familiar with 
the MVP, this research finds that the FERC is weakly captured with both cultural and corrosive 
capture.  
The FERC’s cultural capture is most clearly demonstrated by the repeated influence the 
MVP has over the FERC. In numerous instances, the FERC appears to weigh comments from the 
MVP more than public opinion or the opinion of its own consultants, such as when the FERC 
approves variance requests, allows the MVP to resume construction without all its permits, or 
gives into the MVP and abandons environmental impact analysis. Furthermore, the FERC’s 
corrosive capture is exhibited by the FERC’s actions which corrode both the Natural Gas Act, 
Natural Gas Policy Act, and other bedrock environmental laws. For example, the FERC’s 
practice of tolling ~96% of rehearing requests during the study effectively delays due process 
long enough for the pipeline to near completion. Another key example of the FERC’s corrosive 
capture is the FERC’s unprecedented interpretation of Environmental Condition 9 on the MVP, 
which typically requires that pipelines have their permits together to construct. On the MVP, the 
FERC decided that this condition meant the MVP only needed permits when it began 
construction and not throughout construction. In contrast to cultural and corrosive capture 
evidence, the case study revealed no evidence of material capture besides a weak revolving door 
 
12. Glick, Richard, “Commissioner Richard Glick Dissent Regarding Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC.,” (Dissent, 
Washington, DC: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, December 17, 2020). 
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association. Overall, the FERC’s capture is deemed weak by this research because the FERC 
does useful environmental mitigation and a free-for-all on natural gas pipelines can lead to 
overbuilding and resource sacrifice zones.   
After determining the FERC was experiencing capture via the MVP case, this paper 
investigated when and how capture began with researching the history of the Federal Power 
Commission (FPC) which preceded the FERC in regulating natural gas pipelines and reviewing 
the regulatory history of the FERC. The review exposed that the FPC experienced agency decay, 
particularly after vague legislation and a ruinous Supreme Court decision that buried the FPC in 
regulatory work and inadvertently led to the natural gas crisis.13,14 Following the early natural 
gas crisis and the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, the FERC also demonstrated corrosive and 
cultural capture when the FERC codified the industry’s actions and sidestepped the certificate 
process for natural gas pipelines that Congress had intended. This research hypothesizes that the 
FERC and FPC acted in response to the natural gas crisis and bubble, eventually leaning into the 
industry’s voices and slowly becoming culturally and corrosively captured. Collectively, these 
findings indicate that the FERC has experienced capture since its conception over 30 years ago. 
This finding is tempered by recognition that the nascent FERC likely saw an alignment of 
interests between the public and the energy industry, giving the FERC little reason to worry 
about balancing the two interests and instead, allowing the FERC to provide the energy industry 
“protection without capture.”15 However, as the public’s interests diverged from the private 
interest over time, the FERC’s policies remained stagnant and capture became more apparent. 
 
13. Bernstein, Marver H., “The Life Cycle of Regulatory Commissions,” in Regulating Business by Independent 
Commission, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955), 74-102. 
14. Raley, David, "The Philips vs. Wisconsin Decision and the Decline of Regulatory Effectiveness," Business 
History Conference. Business and Economic History On-line: Papers Presented at the BHC Annual Meeting, vol. 
15, (2017): 1-11. 
15. Carpenter, Daniel, “Protection without Capture,” 613-631. 
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An analysis of capture at the FERC is important because finding and remedying capture 
should be a goal of ideal governance. When regulated industries dominate regulatory decision-
making, the public interest is compromised. As Senator Whitehouse put it, capture lets the 
regulated industry take a “second secret bite at the apple” after having already lobbied 
Congress.16 The forbidden bite then threatens democratic processes. In this case, numerous 
interviewees mentioned their belief that low public opinion of the FERC had eroded trust in the 
public participation process and less comments were sent to the FERC as a result. In principle, 
this is a dangerous self-reinforcing cycle where less landowner concerns are heard by the FERC 
and the FERC falls deeper into cultural capture. Additionally, capture can lead to less regulation 
in irrevocable ways. In other words, the Mountain Valley Pipeline cannot be un-built and the 
damage to the environment cannot be undone.  
Moreover, without a diagnosis and understanding of capture, capture cannot be remedied. 
Given the FERC’s cultural and corrosive capture, the FERC should improve public participation 
and modify the outdated 1999 policy on how it approves natural gas pipelines. Congress and the 
Executive should develop oversight of the FERC, implement a more defined legislative agenda 
for the FERC, and distance the FERC’s interactions with the industries it regulates. The 
government’s previous attempts to resolve capture by giving landowners a voice was only a 
meager attempt at solving capture and allowing agencies to fall prey to the invisible strings of 




16. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Judiciary, Protecting the Public Interest: Understanding the Threat of 





II. Regulatory Capture’s Invisibility 
 
While industry corruption has been an age-old concern from Plato’s age to the modern 
day, regulatory capture theory was only recently introduced in 1952.17 In the early 1950s, Samuel 
Huntington described the Interstate Commerce Commission’s capture and called for its abolition 
given that the agency had ceased to be independent.18 Following, Marver Bernstein presented a 
theory of capture in which vague legislative agendas, restricted administrative powers, and 
judicial interpretation led to agency decay and the development of a “subtle relationship” 
between agencies and the industries they regulate.19,20 Nearly twenty years later, Huntington and 
Bernstein’s view of capture as an unwelcome guest or aberration in agency function was 
replaced with the view that capture was the default.21 To illustrate, George Stigler’s famous 
capture theory posited that “as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and 
operated primarily for its benefit.”22 Stigler and other voices ushered in a new era of public 
cynicism about agencies’ abilities to protect the public interest and thereafter, cynicism about all 
political institutions became the norm.23,24 This cynicism also pervaded the courts, who doubted 
the ability of agencies to independently regulate.25  
As a result of this sentiment and other factors such as a growing dislike of agency 
incrementalism, the late 1960s and 1970s were a time of political awakening and reeling in the 
 
17. Novak, William J., “A Revisionist History of Regulatory Capture,” in Preventing Regulatory Capture, ed. 
Carpenter, Daniel & Moss, David, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 25-48. 
18. Huntington, Samuel P., "The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the Railroads, and the Public Interest," 
Yale Law Journal 61, no. 4 (1952): 467-509. 
19. Bernstein, Marver H., “The Life Cycle of Regulatory Commissions,” 83. 
20. Sabatier, Paul, "Social movements and regulatory agencies: Toward a more adequate—and less pessimistic—
theory of “clientele capture”," Policy Sciences 6, no. 3 (1975): 301-342. 
21. Novak, William J., “A Revisionist History of Regulatory Capture,” 25-48. 
22. Stigler, George J, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," The Bell Journal of Economics and Management 
Science (1971): 3. 
23. Novak, “A Revisionist History of Regulatory Capture,” 25-48. 





regulatory state, which shaped the design of American bureaucracy.26 These changes in the 
environmental domain are evidenced by the subsequent Clean Air Act (1963), National 
Environmental Policy Act (1970), Clean Water Act (1972), and Endangered Species Act (1973). 
With robust changes in legislation, Congress gave fresh responsibilities to agencies and also 
started to put the environment and landowners into agencies’ decision processes.27 At the time, 
Congress believed that giving agencies a specific mandate and encouraging a diversity of 
viewpoints could prevent capture.28 The courts also responded; in 1971 Judge Wright wrote, 
“Our duty, in short, is to see that important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of 
Congress, are not lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy.”29  
Although Congress and the courts attempted to remedy capture and some scholars 
believed environmental bodies were not as susceptible to capture, symptoms of capture have still 
appeared among these agencies.30 In 1999, “slippage” or a gap between the environmental 
regulatory intent and the regulatory reality was documented with examples including the Clinton 
administration’s interpretation of the Endangered Species Act.31 More recently, academics 
conducted interviews with EPA employees and alleged that the EPA under President Trump’s 
administration was moving towards agency capture.32 
 
26. Zinn, Matthew D, “Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation, Capture, and Citizen Suits,” 
Stanford Environmental Law Journal 21 (2002): 81-176. 
27. Glicksman, Robert L., “A Retreat from Judicial Activism: The Seventh Circuit and the Environment,” Chicago-
Kent Law Review, (1987): 209-254.  
28. Zinn, “Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement,” 81-176. 
29. CALVERT CLIFFS'COORD. COM. v. United States AE Com'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
30. Zinn, “Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement,” 81-176. 
31. Farber, Daniel A, "Taking slippage seriously: noncompliance and creative compliance in environmental 
law," Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 23 (1999): 297. 
32. Dillon, L., Sellers, C., Underhill, V., Shapiro, N., Ohayon Liss, J., Sullivan, M., et al., “The Environmental 
Protection Agency in the Early Trump Administration: Prelude to Regulatory Capture,” American Journal of Public 
Health, 108 (2018): 89-94. 
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Despite Congress’ and the courts’ efforts, why has agency capture been so difficult to 
deter? In part, because it is difficult to identify. Capture literature has no strong consensus on 
what capture is. For example, Bernstein did not strictly define capture but mentioned how 
agencies “relate their goals and objectives to the demands of dominant interest groups in the 
economy.”33,34 Others have defined capture as “the result or process by which regulation, in law 
or application, is consistently or repeatedly directed away from the public interest and toward the 
interests of the regulated industry, by the intent and action of the industry itself”35 or “regulators 
consistently favoring the preferred policies of targets of regulation, resulting from an exercise of 
power by the regulated industry.”36 Moreover, capture means that the agency works against the 
public’s interest and towards the private interest, which means diagnosing capture necessitates 
defining both the public and private interest and that is often not simple to do.37 
Even when capture is broadly defined and identified, it must also be categorized by 
mechanism. As aforementioned, capture can be divided into 1) material capture and 2) cultural 
capture. Material capture refers to the industry’s use of its resources to influence regulators. For 
example, material capture frequently refers to campaign donations and the revolving-door 
phenomenon.38,39 Material capture can also be more concealed; legislators fund regulators and 
industry can provide that funding.40 In contrast, cultural capture is more intangible. As Kwak 
defines, cultural capture entails the regulator being persuaded by three factors: “identity, status, 
 
33. Bernstein, “The Life Cycle of Regulatory Commissions,” 92. 
34. Rex, “Anatomy of agency capture,” 273. 
35. Carpenter & Moss, “Introduction,” 13. 
36. Rex, “Anatomy of agency capture,” 273. 
37. Carpenter, “Detecting and Measuring Capture,” 57-68. 
38. Rex, “Anatomy of agency capture,” 271-294. 
39. Zinn, “Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement,” 81-176. 
40. Kwak, James, “Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis”, in Preventing Regulatory Capture, ed. Carpenter, 
Daniel & Moss, David, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 71-98. 
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and relationships.”41 This theory recognizes the humanity of the regulator, who is vulnerable to a 
variety of known and unknown psychological forces. For example, research has suggested 
regulators who become inundated by information from the industry they regulate may believe it 
more and regulators who run in the same social circles as industry actors may buy into their 
arguments more. This type of cultural capture is commonly discussed in the context of the 2008 
financial crisis and the Securities and Exchange Commission. However, cultural capture is not 
exclusive to agency-industry relationships. For example, one study identified that rangers from 
the Forest Service were captured by the people they lived with in the field because they started to 
identify with them.42 Lastly, both material and cultural capture can also coexist with 3) corrosive 
capture, when the agency “corrodes” the intent of the legislation.43 This type of capture is now 
common as industries seek less regulation than what Congress intended.  
Though even when capture is likely, it is often invisible and difficult to prove to be the 
driving force behind regulatory outcomes. Capture is a state of “being persuaded” where 
evidence is rare, whereas corruption entails some impropriety or clandestine acts where 
sometimes evidence can be found.44 Weak capture, when captured agencies still serve the public 
but lean into the industry’s voices, can be insidious. Likewise, strong capture, when agencies or 
policies should be replaced, may be more clear than weak capture but is still difficult to find 
evidence of.45 Without well-defined evidence of capture, it is both easy to ignore capture and 
allege capture. As Carpenter & Moss explain, the capture literature has a significant number of 
capture misdiagnoses with scholars who jump to pin administrative failures on capture without 
 
41. Ibid, 80.  
42. Kaufman, Herbert, The Forest Ranger, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1960), 3-100. 
43. Carpenter & Moss, “Introduction,” 1-22. 
44. Hempling, Scott, ““Regulatory Capture:” Sources and Solutions,” Emory Corporate Governance Accountability 
and Review 1, no. 1 (2014): 25. 
45. Carpenter & Moss, “Introduction,” 1-22. 
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describing how the capture occurs, particularly after the 2008 financial crisis and the Deepwater 
Horizon (BP) Oil Spill.46 Instead, some of these claims may instead be what Carpenter dubs 
“protection without capture,” what he finds when the FDA protects its own interests in high 
stakes drug approvals.47 Furthermore, other actors confound any capture case. The FERC 
provides natural gas pipelines a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) after 
weighing the public interest and conducting an environmental analysis in accordance with the 
















46. Carpenter & Moss, “Introduction,” 1-22. 




Given the frequent misdiagnoses of capture, Carpenter & Moss emphasize the below method 
as the gold standard for diagnosing capture: 
1. “Provide a defeasible model of the public interest 
2. Show a policy shift away from the public interest and toward industry (special interest) 
3. Show action and intent by the industry (special interest) in pursuit of this policy shift 
sufficiently effective to have plausibly caused an appreciable part of the shift”48 
Applying the Carpenter & Moss (2014) criteria, this research diagnosed the FERC’s 
regulatory capture using the MVP case study. The research focused on interviews with fourteen 
stakeholders and review of public records from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s 
eLibrary, the Federal Register, and archives. Interviewees included Chairman Glick’s office, 
environmental attorneys, a former energy lobbyist, journalists, environmental group leaders 
including from the Sierra Club, a local government pipeline committee member, and a former 
regulator – many of whom lived near the MVP. A full list of interviewees is available in 
Appendix A. Interviews were conducted with Yale University Institutional Review Board 
review. 
In this case study, capture was defined as “regulators consistently favoring the preferred 
policies of targets of regulation, resulting from an exercise of power by the regulated industry.”49 
In addition, the private interest was defined according to previous studies as completing the 
project and avoiding heavy regulation.50 In contrast, the public’s interest was defined in 
accordance to how the FERC should see it. Although the courts have ruled the FERC’s concept 
of the public interest should focus on having natural gas supplies, the public interest is more 
aptly defined using the themes of Congress’ delegated actions to the FERC.51 The FERC’s 
 
48. Carpenter & Moss, “Introduction,” 15. 
49. Rex, “Anatomy of agency capture,” 273. 
50. Sidney A. Shapiro, "The Complexity of Regulatory Capture: Diagnosis, Causality, and Remediation," Roger 
Williams University Law Review 17, no. 1 (2012): 221-257. 
51. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Facilities,” 
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interest should be ensuring an adequate energy supply, protecting the public’s health, preserving 
the environment, and looking after the public’s general democratic rights.52 This interpretation of 
public interest is also supported by the FERC’s statements when opening inquiry into the 1999 
policy on certifying natural gas pipelines.53  
The analysis applied a process-tracing methodology and was supplemented by the 
Institutional Analysis and Design (IAD) Framework.54,55 The IAD framework is a method to 
understand the factors which influence decision-making. Process-tracing involves producing a 
description of events and treating the events as tests for one’s hypothesis to find causal inference 
(see figure 2 and 3).  
Causal Puzzle: To explain the influence of industry on the FERC’s actions on the MVP 
Main actors: 
• FERC 
• Sister agencies including USFWS, USACE, EPA, 
USDA, BLM 
• State actors including WVDEP & VDEQ 
 
• Local government  
• Elected officials 
• Interest groups 
• Public 
Hypotheses: 
H1) If the FERC is captured, the public and private interests diverge. 
H2) If the FERC is captured, it consistently favors the industry’s interests over the public’s interest. 
H3) If the FERC is captured, the industry exercises some influence over the FERC. 
H3-a) If the FERC accepts material contributions from the energy industry, the FERC is materially captured. 
H3-b) If the FERC disproportionately weighs voices from the energy industry, the FERC is culturally captured. 





Agency-industry cooperation  






Fig. 2 - Causal puzzle of FERC’s regulatory capture. Original figure based on Collier (2011)57 
 
(Notice of Inquiry, Washington, DC, 2018). 
52. King, Stephen M., Chilton, Bradley S., and Roberts, Gary E., “Reflections on Defining the Public Interest,” 
Administration & Society 41, no. 8 (2010): 954-978. 
53. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Facilities,” 
(Notice of Inquiry, Washington, DC, 2018). 
54. Collier, David, “Understanding Process Tracing,” PS: Political Science & Politics 44, no. 4 (2011): 823-30. 
55. Polski, Margaret M., & Ostrom, Elinor, “An Institutional Framework for Analysis and Design,” Indiana 
University, 1999: 2-49 
56. Carpenter, “Detecting and Measuring Capture”, 66. 




Fig. 3 - Collier’s tests for process-tracing. Figure source: Table 1, Collier (2011)58 
 
Collier’s tests (see figure 3) indicate whether the test is sufficient and/or necessary for 
accepting the hypothesis. A straw-in-the-wind test is both unnecessary and insufficient for 
confirming a hypothesis and an event which passes a straw-in-the-wind test may be a pro-
industry decision that alone does not confirm capture but does affirm the relevance of the 
hypothesis. Next, a hoop test is necessary but not sufficient for affirming the hypothesis. An 
example of a hoop test is whether the FERC’s original certification of the MVP works against 
the public interest. Moreover, a smoking-gun test is not necessary but is sufficient for affirming 
capture. In this case, an event which is a smoking-gun test for the hypothesis is proof of material 
or cultural capture, such as the exchange of material contributions or evidence from an agency 
representative that the agency is influenced by the industry. Lastly, there is the doubly decisive 
test which is both necessary and sufficient. A doubly decisive test is uncommon in social 
science, but an event which passes this test could be a direct conversation with an agency 






paper applies these tests to the case study of the MVP then analyzes the history of natural gas 
























IV. Mountain Valley Pipeline – Cultural & Corrosive Capture 
 
 This chapter process-traces the MVP’s path from 2014 to the current state with the major 
highlights in the FERC’s rulings and record via the hoop tests, straw-in-the-wind tests, and 
smoking-gun tests for capture. This regulatory history is complicated by the interactions of 
several actors such as other agencies, but the FERC oversees the MVP’s approval as the arbiter 
of the natural gas pipeline’s Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN). 
The Interstate Natural Gas Association of America breaks the process for pipeline 
approval generally into five phases that this chapter will explore in greater detail:  
1. Conduct a pre-market assessment 
2. Conduct FERC pre-filing 
3. File a formal application with the FERC  
4. Analysis is conducted, receive CPCN 
5. Receive permits, get final approval to begin construction60  
 
 





60. Interstate Natural Gas Association of America, Pipeline Permitting, (Washington D.C: Interstate Natural Gas 
Association of America). 
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Hoop Tests: The Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity 
The FERC’s analysis from 2014 to the issuance of the CPCN in October 2017 is a hoop 
test which the hypotheses on public and private interests diverging (H1), the FERC consistently 
favoring the industry interest (H2), and the industry exercising influence over the FERC (H3) 
pass. This is demonstrated primarily by two points: a) lack of necessity for the pipeline b) 
evidence of harm to the public and the environment. These concerns are exacerbated by the 
FERC’s inadequate analyses and public comment process. 
To begin, the FERC’s analysis of necessity substantiates that the private interest is 
outcompeting the public interest within the FERC. The MVP crosses 303 miles from Wetzel 
County, West Virginia to Pittsylvania County, Virginia, transporting gas from an interconnection 
in West Virginia to a compressor station in Virginia (see appendix B for specific route).61 The 
MVP’s location is strategic; the companies spearheading the project (namely Equitrans) intend 
for the MVP to transport gas from the booming shales in the Appalachian region (see figure 5). 
According to the MVP, the Marcellus and Utica shale production rates have grown by 13 Bcf/d 
from 2010 to 2014 and the Appalachian Basin produces approximately 40% of America’s natural 
gas.62 The U.S. is also relying on the shale gas boom for the country’s energy independence.63 
The MVP is further motivated by estimated increased natural gas consumption, coal-switching, 
declining supplies of natural gas from the Gulf, and the need for more natural gas in areas along 
the pipeline route.64  
 
61. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Draft Environmental Impact Statement,” (Environmental Impact 
Statement, Washington, D.C, 2016).  
62. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC., “Application for Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity,” 
(Application, Washington, D.C: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2015). 
63. Lu, Hongfang; Ma, Xin; Azimi, Mohammadamin, “US natural gas consumption prediction using an improved 
kernel-based nonlinear extension of the Arps decline model,” Energy 194 (2020): 116905. 
64. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC., “Application for Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity,” 




Fig. 5 - U.S. dry shale gas production per day. Figure Source: Energy Information 
Administration (2020)65 
 
Though the MVP contends the pipeline is necessary and will have local benefits such as 
“construction spending benefits, operational benefits, [and] direct-use benefits,” others are not so 
convinced.66,67 The FERC considered the MVP in the public necessity according to precedent 
agreements with shippers, which the FERC said were “best evidence that additional gas will be 
needed.”68 However, these subscribers are affiliates with the MVP that have a percentage share 
of ownership of the MVP and many have argued the affiliate relationship should change the 
 
65. Energy Information Administration, “Natural gas explained: where our natural gas comes from,” (Webpage, 
Washington, D.C., 2020), https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/natural-gas/where-our-natural-gas-comes-from.php 
66. Ditzel, Ken, Fisher, Rob, and Chakrabarti, Kaustav, Economic Benefits of the Mountain Valley Pipeline Project 
in West Virginia, (Pittsburgh: FTI Consulting/Mountain Valley Pipeline, 2015), 1. 
http://www.mountainvalleypipeline.info/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Mountain_Valley_Pipeline_West-
Virginia_Report_02Oct2015.pdf  
67. Ditzel, Ken, Fisher, Rob, and Chakrabarti, Kaustav, Economic Benefits of the Mountain Valley Pipeline Project 
in Virginia, (Pittsburgh: FTI Consulting/Mountain Valley Pipeline, 2015), 1. 
http://www.mountainvalleypipeline.info/wp-
content/uploads/2019/03/Mountain_Valley_Pipeline_Virginia_Report_02Oct2015.pdf  
68. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Order Issuing Certificates and Granting Abandonment Authority,” 
(Order, Washington, D.C, 2017), 17. 
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FERC’s interpretation. However, the FERC has a policy that it does not need to “look behind” 
precedent agreements and the FERC has disagreed that affiliation changes the understanding of 
the market need.69,70 These agreements were additionally incomplete. Commissioner LaFleur 
described that the ACP had signed precedent agreements with percentages for where the gas will 
go (such as 8.9% industrial), whereas the MVP had 13% of its gas where the destination was 
unclear and would be decided later.71 These agreements were not provided to commenters. 
The need for the pipeline is also not supported by natural gas usage trends. Previously, 
the FERC had weighed whether the MVP would be overbuilding, and the MVP replied with its 
own market study which Appalachian Mountain Advocates deemed relied on data from a “cold 
winter.”72 A later report concluded that the MVP was expecting the need for natural gas to grow 
over the next 20 years, which it was using to justify the development, but the report expected the 
pipeline’s supply to exceed demand over time.73 Another report found that demand growth in 
foreign markets could be lower than the MVP expected.74 U.S. Energy Information 
Administration data also demonstrates that natural gas consumption has dipped recently, 
dropping by 1.89 bcf/d from 2019 to 2020.75 These data points suggest that the MVP is both not 
 
69. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Certification of New Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Facilities,” 
(Policy, Washington, DC, 1999), 3. 
70. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Order Issuing Certificates and Granting Abandonment Authority,” 
(Order, Washington D.C, 2017). 
71. Ibid. 
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(Order, Washington D.C, 2017), 16. 
73. Wilson, Rachel, Fields, Spencer, Knight, Patrick, McGee, Ed, Ong, Wendy, Santen, Nidhi, Vitolo, Thomas and 
Stanton, Elizabeth, Are the Atlantic Coast Pipeline and the Mountain Valley Pipeline Necessary?, (Cambridge: 
Synapse Energy Economics, 2016), 1-26. 
74. Kunkel, Cathy, Williams-Derry, Clark, and Mattei, Suzanne, Mountain Valley Pipeline Faces Uphill Struggle to 
Financial Viability, (Lakewood: Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, 2021), http://ieefa.org/wp-
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75. Energy Information Administration, “Short-Term Energy Outlook,” (Report: Washington, D.C: Energy 
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clearly necessary for ensuring an adequate national energy supply and also that the FERC relied 
on industry data in approving the MVP.   
Next, the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) 
demonstrates the harms of the MVP and how the FERC inadequately assessed those, often 
ceding to the MVP. The FERC evaluated considerations such as air quality, water quality, forest 
impacts, erosion, and impacts to endangered species. These impacts are summarized below. In 
terms of health impacts, the MVP will primarily impact localities near its three compressor 
stations.76 A 2017 report on the health effects associated with chemical emissions from New 
York state compressor stations found that in a 7-year period, 18 of the compressor station sites 
released pollutants made of 70 chemicals linked to 19 of 20 major categories of disease.77 
Compressor stations are usually located on 15-22 acres of rural land, but the MVP compressor 
stations will use around 5.6-7 acres in fairly populous areas.78,79  
The MVP also threatens water quality at a unique risk because it crosses a steep terrain, 
where the soil may be saturated and runoff can occur. 80 The MVP is close to crucial drinking 
water areas such as the Roanoke River, just 1.1 miles from the drinking intake for the Western 
Virginia Water Authority which provides water for 60,000 people in Virginia and West 
Virginia.81 According to an interview with Maury Johnson, an affected landowner and non-profit 
leader, MVP construction on his farm has made his water too turbid to drink.82 The FERC’s 
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78. Folga, S. M, "Natural gas pipeline technology overview," (Technical Report, Washington, D.C, 2007), 1-56. 
79. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Final Environmental Impact Statement,” (Environmental Impact 
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interactions with the MVP on some of these water concerns are also telling of the influence of 
industry voices on the FERC. The MVP was asked to have a 75-feet right-of-way in wetlands in 
accordance with standard FERC policy around the time of the DEIS, but by the release of the 
FEIS, the MVP was allowed to have a greater right-of-way against the original recommendations 
of the FERC.83 
The MVP’s location across Karst terrain and in a seismically active zone further adds to 
the risk to public health. Karst terrain is prone to landslides, sinkholes, and caves. According to 
Joan Walker, a Senior Campaign Representative for the Sierra Club’s Beyond Dirty Fuels, this 
pipeline cannot be legally built because of the route.84 Similarly, a professor of geology produced 
a report on the MVP calling karst terrain a “no build” zone.85 An MVP-filing with the FERC in 
2019 demonstrates the effects of Karst; as a result of a landslide, the MVP had to clear more 
trees and decided the home near the right-of-way was now uninhabitable.86 Johnson, the 
aforementioned landowner who has become a watchdog activist, also mentioned there had been 
2 earthquakes since construction began. Johnson has now written over 200 complaints of the 
MVP’s violations to the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (see figure 6). In 
response to Johnson’s complaints, the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection 
has fined the MVP twice, but Johnson continues to find construction problems frequently.87,88,89  
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Fig. 6 - Slope slipping in Monroe county, WV. Figure Source: Personal communication with 
Maury Johnson. 
 
Moreover, the MVP places animal and plant populations at risk. The FERC determined 
the MVP could affect 23 threatened or endangered species. For example, the Roanoke logperch 
has been listed as an endangered species since August 1989 in part due to the construction of the 
Roanoke river Basin in the 1950s and 1960s.90 Aside from these endangered species, other 
reports have found the MVP could affect other more common species like trout.91 Furthermore, 
there is risk of pipeline leak or rupture which will hurt both animals and humans. The majority of 
interstate pipelines are around 24-36 inches in diameter, but the MVP is 42 inches in diameter, 
which aggravates this risk.92,93 The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 
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Statement, Washington D.C, 2017). 
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93. Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC., “Application for Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity,” 
(Application, Washington, D.C: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2015). 
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(PHMSA) reports that since 2000, there have been 5,754 significant pipeline incidents associated 
with 280 fatalities and 1,183 injuries. There were also 316 incidents in 2019 alone.94 
Lastly, the FERC has a duty to look after the public’s democratic rights.95 When the 
FERC confers a CPCN to a pipeline, the natural gas company obtains the right of eminent 
domain which is then overseen by the states. The FERC has held it does not give pipelines 
eminent domain power, The Natural Gas Act does.96 There is an unassessed side to the 
agreements though; interviewees who wished to remain anonymous disclosed landowners who 
do not comply with the MVP’s demands on easements face bullying when working with the 
pipeline. Landowners have also been asked to sign confidentiality agreements. Ken Ward, a 
journalist interviewed in this research, mentioned that these types of easements have precedent in 
coal mining in West Virginia as well.97 Environmental attorneys also explained that many 
landowners are lied to by the pipeline company about their neighbors signing the offer, causing 
them to take a lowball offer.98  
Protecting democratic rights also includes protecting the public’s cultural lands such as 
Peters Mountain, Jefferson National Forest (JNF), the Appalachian Trail (AT), and the Blue 
Ridge Parkway (BLRI) (see figure 7). The MVP crosses the JNF along a 3.5-mile corridor in a 
manner that is not consistent with JNF Forest Plan standards.99 Moreover, the MVP crosses the 
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BLRI, a 469-mile expanse through Virginia and North Carolina that attracts millions of visitors 
every year. Similar to crossing JNF, crossing the Blue Ridge Parkway has been controversial due 
to the hazardous impacts the pipeline could have on the community and ecology there. Citizens 
raised these cultural concerns in part because their families had land for generations and they 
were now being forced to change their way of life. For example, Roberta Johnson from Bottom 
Creek George in Virginia described that “Third, the southern portion of Virginia has been 
occupied by humans for at least 11,500 years; and there are rich cultural resources along the 
Roanoke River and its tributaries.”100 Similarly, two journalists interviewed during this research 
explained that several landowners had owned the farms the MVP was taking for generations but 
were moving from the region due to the pipeline.101 Aside from disturbing these cultural 
resources, the MVP has also been criticized for disturbing indigenous peoples’ resources and 
native homelands.102  
 
Fig. 7 - Map of MVP and ACP. Figure Source: Appalachian Voices, Ashton Johnson.103 
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The FERC’s analysis of these many considerations has been criticized as inadequate. For 
example, the U.S. Department of the Interior stated the “current DEIS lacks sufficient 
information to perform adequate analysis of impacts.” The Bureau of Land Management also 
asked for a revised or supplemental draft statement.104 The FERC’s initial calculation of the 
GHGs was also criticized by the Environmental Protection Agency after the FERC gave a figure 
for GHGs emissions using carbon monoxide instead of carbon dioxide (carbon monoxide is not a 
GHG) and the FERC claimed there was no standard for assessing GHGs.105  
Lastly, those facing the consequences of the MVP are not reaping the benefits or in other 
words, the FERC does not follow principles of distributive justice.106 West Virginia has 
historically been labeled an energy sacrifice state. In 1910, the coal companies were invited to 
“take what they wanted” from West Virginia and when West Virginia subsequently had a 
recession, mining companies retreated.107 Work eventually returned after World War 2 but living 
conditions near mines did not improve and poverty was rampant. This led to the invention of the 
Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) which reduced poverty but also encouraged 
development, including a regional highway system that made coal mining feasible.108 A 
statement from a member of the Upper West Fork River Watershed Association to the 95th 
Senate reveals extent of these ongoing sacrifices, “The people of the state of West Virginia have 
been asked time and time again to sacrifice their land –for the railroads, for the timber industry, 
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for the coal industry, for the gas industry, and for the interstate highway system.”109 In 1990, the 
mining industry changed, largely switching to mountaintop removal mining and by 1997, West 
Virginia outpaced other states in mountaintop mining by several metrics.110 President Obama 
began to acknowledge the inequity of West Virginia’s sacrifice, citing that coal was not 
sustainable for the Appalachian economy, but President Trump reverted back to a pro-energy 
industry stance. Today, Appalachians are turning with the energy tide from a coal-sacrifice state 
to a natural gas sacrifice state and the MVP is one more example of that. To transport gas from 
the Appalachian shales, at least 19 new pipelines or pipeline extensions are being constructed in 
the region and the MVP is one of the largest.111 The FERC has disagreed that pipelines should be 
evaluated on a region-wide basis because the policy is to evaluate individual pipelines.112 
However, at the time the MVP was approved, it was would have been working in tandem to the 
ACP. Commissioner LaFleur dissented from granting the CPCN for this reason.113 Likewise, 
Collin Rees, a Senior Campaigner at Oil Change International, said the MVP was part of an 
“asymmetric war.”114  
To understand the extent of inequity, population level indicators were analyzed (see table 
1 below). The population sizes revealed more dense counties are affected in Virginia, but more 
counties overall are affected in West Virginia. The results also indicate that the populations 
affected by the MVP are predominantly low-income. In West Virginia, the per capita personal 
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income in 2017 was $38,927, $13,191 lower than the national figure. The health data also 
revealed high rates of disabled persons and persons with fair or poor health. Fayette, West 
Virginia stood out with a disability rate of 26.9% (14.3% more than the national figure) and as a 
site where a compressor station will be built. A 2019 study had similar findings, discovering 
spatial inequities for jobs and air-polluted related deaths in counties of energy-producing states 
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Days (2020) (7) 
US 322,941,31
1 
87.4 52,118 14.0 12.6 N/A N/A 
West 
Virginia 
1,831,023 77.1 38,927 17.9 19.5 24 5.3 
Braxton, WV* 14,323 28.4 30,319 21.3 20.7 23 5.4 
Doddridge, 
WV 
8,576 26.1 26,850 19.7 20.1 19 4.8 
Fayette, WV* 44,179 68.9 33,050 19.7 26.9 24 5.6 
Greenbrier, 
WV 
35,532 35 36,499 16.0 20.9 22 5.2 
Harrison, WV 68,349 165.8 45,314 14.6 18.1 21 5.0 
Lewis, WV 16,289 42.7 36,868 18.4 19.8 23 5.4 
Monroe, WV 13,487 28.5 30,099 17.3 25.1 23 5.4 
Nicholas, WV 25,381 40.1 32,132 21.4 20.9 26 5.7 
Summers, WV 12,978 37.6 32,206 24.7 28.9 25 5.5 
Webster, WV 8,557 16.1 27,285 30.0 18.0 26 5.7 
Wetzel, WV* 15,644 45.3 33,432 19.5 19.7 24 5.6 
Virginia 8,382,321 202.6 55,631 11.0 11.8 16 3.5 
Craig, VA 5,120 15.8 36,942 12.6 15.9 13 3.4 
Franklin, VA 56,158 81.6 39,233 13.2 14.5 16 3.7 
Giles, VA 16,827 48 38,325 12.2 14.3 14 3.5 
Montgomery, 
VA 
98,172 248.6 36,125 20.3 10.0 16 3.5 
Pittsylvania, 
VA 
61,704 64.4 36,750 13.6 18.0 18 3.9 
Roanoke, VA 93,528 373.3 50,460 7.4 11.0 14 3.2 
Table 1 - Characteristics of populations affected by MVP. Asterisk indicates compressor station 
site. Data sources116 
 
116. Sources: 
(1): U.S. Census Bureau, County Population Totals 2010-2019, (2020), https://www.census.gov/data/datasets/time-
series/demo/popest/2010s-counties-total.html  
(2): U.S. Census Bureau, Density Data, (2010)   
(3): Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Final Environmental Impact Statement,” (Environmental Impact 
Statement, Washington D.C, 2017). 




Lastly, the public comment period in 2015 and 2017 revealed mixed public opinion about 
the MVP. A 2016 poll conducted for the West Virginia Oil & Natural Gas Association 
determined that 41% of West Virginians strongly supported underground pipelines in West 
Virginia to transport natural gas.117 Similarly, a 2021 Mason-Dixon Polling & Research poll 
found that 62% of Virginians supported the MVP and specifically, 74% of residents around 
Roanoke supported the MVP.118 To supplement polls, the comments from the meetings can serve 
as a rough proxy for the public opinion of those who attempted to participate in the FERC 
process. This research categorized the comments from the original scoping meetings as pro-MVP 
or against-MVP, finding that 6% of comments were for the MVP. However, the low-percentage 
of speakers for the MVP at the meetings may be because the building state is perceived as the 
status-quo and there is no need to comment as several interviewees in this research noted. It may 
also be due to pressure; a commentor who spoke in favor of the MVP was “boo’d” by their 
peers. Procedural errors with the comment period could also explain the breakdown of speakers. 
These meetings were not interactive and lacked notice (the first group received six days’ notice), 
lacked some relevant speakers (speakers like the DOT were missing at times), and lacked 
 




(6): US Census Bureau, American Community Survey Narrative Profile, (2019), 
https://www.census.gov/acs/www/data/data-tables-and-tools/narrative-profiles/2019/ 
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information (the compressor stations and route was not finalized).119,120 According to David 
Sligh, the Conservation Director for Wild Virginia, others had told him FERC representatives at 
meetings told participants they didn’t need to comment on something.121 Yet, the comments may 
still be a good proxy because interviewees described residents are eager to speak; Walker from 
the Sierra Club said that, “The in-person meetings mean a lot to people. [They think] at least I 
got my day to stand up and say what I wanted to.”122 
 In sum, the analysis above uncovers that the MVP has clear harms to the public health, 
the environment, and democratic principles which disproportionately affect populations who 
have suffered in an energy sacrifice zone. The research also demonstrates several areas where the 
FERC conducted an inadequate environmental analysis and ceded to the requests of the MVP for 
less mitigation measures, suggesting cultural and corrosive capture. Therefore, the hypotheses 
that the public and private interests diverge (H1), the FERC favors the private interest (H2), and 
the industry exercises some influence on the FERC (H3) pass the first hoop test. This event is a 
hoop test because these factors must be true (the hypotheses must jump through the hoop), but 
the event cannot be a smoking-gun or doubly decisive test because it is not clear that the FERC 
acts this way because of capture or another factor like detrimental reliance on its 1999 policy 
statement which it mentions in the CPCN. 
 In contrast, this analysis reveals no evidence of material capture (H3-a) and therefore, the 
hypothesis on material capture fails the hoop test. Material capture was not apparent from the 
environmental analysis or the issuance of the CPCN, though some might point to the revolving 
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door as proof of material capture.123 Chairman Chatterjee, Commissioner LaFleur, and 
Commissioner Powelson considered the CPCN order and Commissioner LaFleur dissented. 
Commissioner LaFleur was appointed by President Trump and previously criticized for her roots 
working at National Grid USA (a utility company) which is a partner on a pipeline project. 
LaFleur’s dissent could be the result of a human-capital theory that suggests regulators work 
against the industry to suggest their experience to the industry, or a market-expansion theory 
where LaFleur attempts to expand the market for when LaFleur exits to industry.124 Under either 
theory, there is not sufficient evidence for a revolving-door phenomenon driving the regulatory 
outcome. Furthermore, a single regulator would not be sufficient evidence for a revolving-door 
phenomenon. 
Straw-in-the-Wind Tests 
Next, this research evaluates the straw-in-the-wind tests which are not sufficient or 
necessary for confirming capture. When the hypotheses pass these tests, it only confirms the 
relevance of the hypothesis on capture, but it does not confirm capture.  
The first straw-in-the-wind test which the third hypothesis on industry influence (H3) 
passes is the FERC’s frequent inadequate analysis of environmental impacts. Inadequate analysis 
is a straw-in-the-wind because agencies can fail to meet standards for several reasons such as a 
high workload, weak personnel, or failure to check on statutory requirements. For example, 
when the FERC evaluated carbon monoxide instead of carbon dioxide for GHGs, it could have 
been an honest mistake or the influence of industry.125 In other examples, the influence of the 
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MVP seems more likely. To illustrate, the MVP was asked to have a 75-feet right-of-way in 
wetlands in accordance with standard FERC policy, but MVP was allowed to have a greater 
right-of-way against the recommendations of the FERC in the DEIS and without more 
analysis.126 Similarly, David Perry, the Executive Director of the Blue Ridge Land Conservancy, 
explained that in his experience on the local Roanoke Pipeline Advisory Committee, everyone 
was blindsided by the pipeline and he had to explain how the pipeline would affect his area to 
agency officials.127 These inadequate analyses do not prove the influence of industry but do 
affirm the relevance of the hypothesis on capture. 
 The second straw-in-the-wind test is the stream-crossing permitting process which the 
hypothesis on favoring private interest (H2) fails. The MVP obtained permits from the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and state governments for the Section 404 and Section 10 
permits under the Clean Water Act and Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act, namely the 
Nationwide Permit 12 (NWP12) in December 2017.128 The NWP12 is advantageous for 
companies because with the NWP12, the USACE does not conduct individual reviews of every 
crossing and there is no project-specific public comment period.129 With the NWP12, state 
regulators would also have to approve the use of the NWP12. The NWP12 soon turned into a 
large controversy, because there was a less thorough review of the stream crossings with the 
NWP12. In 2018, the courts ruled the USACE incorrectly approved the permit when it was not 
consistent with West Virginia state laws.130,131 Across the country, Judge Morris ruled on the 
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Keystone XL pipeline that the NWP12 should not apply to large infrastructure projects like 
pipelines without Endangered Species Act consultation. The Trump administration jolted to 
action and the USACE brought the case to the Justice Department.132 Maury Johnson described 
that soon after, the Trump administration had the Supreme Court issue a one-page decision.133 
The Supreme Court granted a stay until writ of certiorari, allowing the NWP12 to be used for 
other pipelines aside from the Keystone XL.134 Now, the Keystone XL pipeline has stopped 
which has put the NWP12 case to rest.  
Regardless, the MVP’s opposition remained focused on the issue when the MVP 
reapplied for the NWP12 and received the NWP12 again.135 An environmental attorney 
explained West Virginia had already started to change regulations to remove the maximum size 
for pipelines and litigation ensued.136 Conservation groups quickly took the NWP12 back to 
court in October 2020. The brief filed by Appalachian Mountain Advocates describes a troubling 
thought-process the MVP has, with a reference to a quote from Diana Charletta, the President 
and COO of the MVP, who said, “I think the important thing is the ones that are really critical, 
we would try to do it as quickly as possible before anything is challenged and just strategically 
go through it with that kind of thought process” in reference to the stream-crossings.137,138,139 
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When the case was later heard in the Fourth Circuit, the court issued a stay of the USACE 
decision/permit in November 2020.140 Around the same time, the MVP alleged it was half-way 
done with the pipeline and had crossed about 1/3 of the streams it needed to.141  
In January 2021, the MVP finally announced via a letter to the FERC it would pursue 
individual stream crossing permits with the USACE after a two-year legal battle.142 The FERC 
then considered the MVP’s request to allow it to work on components of its stream crossings in 
portions of West Virginia in 2021. The FERC’s commissioners were deadlocked when a 
commissioner abstained, leaving the question in the balance. Though the question went 
unanswered, many such as POWHR took the pause as a victory. In contrast, the MVP responded 
to the deadlock with hope for the FERC deciding on the question in the future.143 It is also worth 
noting that this deadlock came in January 2021 just after Commissioner Christie and 
Commissioner Clements were sworn in.144 The FERC’s action on stream crossings is a straw-in-
the-wind-test which the hypothesis on the FERC consistently favoring the industry (H2) fails, 
because a hypothesis on the FERC consistently favoring the industry (H2) would predict that the 
FERC would have sided with the MVP to allow the MVP to construct across these streams.  
The last straw-in-the-wind test which the hypothesis on the FERC consistently favoring 
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aforementioned, from 1997 to 2017, the FERC approved 400 pipelines and rejected only two 
pipeline proposals, which equates to an approximately 99% approval rating.145 The FERC’s 
history approving most pipelines indicates the FERC has a track record of favoring the industry’s 
interests. However, it is not clear that the industry’s interests always diverged from the public’s 
interest. Before renewable energy took off, it was arguably in the public’s interest to have more 
natural gas pipelines. Therefore, the approval rate only affirms the relevance of the hypothesis on 
the FERC consistently favoring the industry (H2). 
Smoking-Guns 
 Smoking-gun tests are a metaphor for when a suspect is found with a smoking gun and is 
presumed guilty.146 The FERC record demonstrates several smoking guns in the MVP case. 
The first smoking-gun test the hypotheses on favoring the industry’s interest (H2), 
industry influence (H3), cultural capture (H3-b), and corrosive capture (H4) pass is the FERC’s 
granting of MVP variance requests (when the MVP requests a change to the original construction 
plan).147 After the MVP began construction, it began causing landslides, slips, and erosion, 
which caused it to file variance requests with the FERC and deviate from its original 
construction plan. The MVP filed 151 variance requests since beginning construction to 
February 2021.148 Two aspects of the FERC’s track-record on the MVP’s variance requests are 
troubling. To begin, a collection of variances from the non-profit Protect Our Water, Heritage, 
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Rights (POWHR) showed the FERC had approved every variance request and some requests are 
posted within hours of the approval, which voids a useful public comment period. POWHR 
additionally reported the MVP sometimes implemented the change before the FERC sent their 
response.149 The removal of the public comment period and the MVP’s choice to implement 
changes before the FERC’s decision is a corrosion of bedrock environmental laws meant to 
protect the environment and the public’s rights. Moreover, the FERC’s approval of nearly every 
variance request is also suggestive of cultural capture. 
Next, the FERC’s decision to approve a project-wide variance request without 
environmental analysis is highly suggestive of cultural capture. A filing by the Indian Creek 
Watershed Association (ICWA) demonstrates that the FERC approved a project-wide variance to 
reduce the depth at which the pipeline would be buried under streams in September 2018 without 
new environmental analysis, even after the FERC’s Senior Consultant had previously asked the 
MVP to conduct site-specific analyses on previous variance requests. In the past, the MVP 
deemed the analysis would be excessive. The variance request stated, “The original Vertical 
Scour and Later (sic) Channel Erosion and Analysis was a theoretical desktop analysis and did 
not take site specific constructability issues (elevation, terrain, workspace) into account.”150 
Despite the FERC’s Senior Consultant’s request for environmental analysis, the FERC 
Environmental Project Manager, Paul Friedman, then approved this variance without the 
analyses and mitigation was allowed with the assumption of safety.151 This research found no 
evidence of material exchange between Friedman and the MVP, therefore indicating material 
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capture was not the likely culprit. However, Friedman’s siding with the MVP over the FERC’s 
Senior Consultant is suggestive of cultural capture. Friedman might be valuing relationships with 
the industry more, adopting the view of the industry, or perceiving industry reps as of a higher 
status.152 This interpretation is supported by previous criticisms of Friedman when he was 
charged with “badgering, speaking over people” at FERC public meetings which “whitewashed 
the public record.”153 Therefore, the hypotheses on favoring the industry’s interest (H2), industry 
influence (H3), cultural capture (H3-b), and corrosive capture (H4) pass this smoking-gun test. 
The next smoking-gun the hypotheses on the FERC favoring the industry’s interest (H2) 
and corrosive capture (H4) pass is the FERC’s rehearing request process. After the FERC issues 
orders such as the CPCN, parties with standing have 30 days to submit rehearing requests.154 
Submitting a rehearing request and having it denied is key for legal recourse, because until the 
rehearing request is denied, one cannot pursue action in court. Instead of denying the rehearing 
requests within 30-days as required, the FERC sent participants tolling orders which give the 
FERC time to consider the request further and did not deny the request so the parties could seek 
legal action. By the FERC’s own admission, tolling orders “also delayed the ability of the parties 
to seek judicial review.”155 A search of the FERC eLibrary revealed that from the CPCN 
issuance in 2017 to December 2020, 100% of the rehearing requests on the CPCN were 
ultimately rejected, dismissed, or denied. Furthermore, 96% of the denials came after the 
FERC’s 30-day timeline for considering rehearing requests and around 77% were approximately 
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six months late. Similar data was found by an investigation by the Subcommittee on Civil Rights 
and Civil Liberties, which revealed that in 12 years, 114 landowners submitted rehearing 
requests. 100% of these requests were tolled and 100% were later denied. FERC also let 
construction go on before the FERC ruled on the request for 64% of the requests.156 
Tolling had a clear benefit to the MVP and harm to the public because tolling allowed the 
MVP to construct ~90% of the pipeline with faulty permits and tolling violated the due process 
rights of the public. Had it not been for tolling orders, the MVP may not have neared 90% 
completion with improper permits. The MVP’s record of completion is later used as a 
justification in several FERC orders, indicating the gravity of this problem as well. As an 
environmental attorney described, a judge would be more likely to allow a pipeline through if it 
was already underway and the tolling orders gave the pipeline time to construct while rehearing 
requests staggered. Another environmental attorney explained that they tried to stay construction 
during the rehearing response period, but it did not work, which meant the MVP could 
conceivably finish before the parties even made it to court.157 Moreover, even if tolling orders 
did not allow pipelines to complete significant construction, the tolling orders violate due process 
rights. Commissioner Glick has also alluded to this very problem where the pipelines begin 
construction before legal action and said the FERC should stay NGA section 7 certificates until 
rehearing requests are considered.158 Commissioner Richard Glick also believed that Congress 
should review the FERC’s delays in rehearing requests and data showed that the FERC delayed 
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responses on most of its requests in 2018 and 2019.159 Several attorneys who participated in the 
research explained they went to court with tolling orders and hoped they would be able to have 
their case heard. One attorney called the tolling orders the FERC issued the “single greatest 
abomination of administrative law” and that going to court with a tolling order and not a 
rehearing denial was like “walking into a buzzsaw.”160 Likewise, a participant from the Sierra 
Club described that tolling orders effectively were “not letting people have their day in court 
when their land is taken.”161 
Ultimately, in Alleghany Defense Project v. FERC in late June 2020, the court 
determined tolling orders would now be considered a denial of the rehearing request after 30 
days, which would enable the requesting party to take the action to court. In the decision, Judge 
Millett wrote the FERC’s tolling was a “Kafkaesque regime” where the FERC could “keep 
homeowners in seemingly endless administrative limbo while energy companies plow ahead 
seizing land and constructing the very pipeline that the procedurally handcuffed homeowners 
seek to stop.”162 The FERC later ruled that pipelines cannot construct until it considers 
landowner rehearing requests.163 The FERC has also now decided to send notice of denial of 
rehearing if it denies a rehearing request by the 30-day deadline and tolling will deny a request 
after 30 days to enable legal action.164 
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The evidence on rehearing requests is a smoking-gun test which both the hypotheses on 
favoring the industry’s interest (H2) and corrosive capture (H4) pass. The data demonstrates that 
the FERC consistently tolled rehearing requests to the benefit of the MVP and restricted due 
process rights, making the FERC’s tolling practice a smoking-gun for capture. At the same time, 
this research recognizes the FERC is a major federal agency with administrative burdens. 
However, delaying rehearing requests for six months is in excess of administrative burdens, 
which reaffirms the hypotheses. 
 The next smoking-gun tests which the hypotheses on favoring the industry’s interest 
(H2), the industry influencing the FERC (H3), cultural capture (H3-b), and corrosive capture 
(H4) pass are the FERC’s authorizations for the MVP to resume construction. The MVP’s 
construction history is fraught with court orders that stayed permits due to statutory problems 
where the agency does not follow the statute how Congress intended and process problems, 
where the courts find the reasoning used is inconsistent with precedent, evidence, or statute.165  
 The MVP first lost its right-of-way for Jefferson National Forest (JNF) in July 2018 
because construction was not lawful under the National Environmental Policy Act, Mineral 
Leasing Act, and National Forest Management Act, causing the MVP to lose authority to cross 
JNF.166 The FERC issued a stop-work order on August 3, 2018 because the MVP might have had 
to modify the route due to the case. By the end of August 2018, the FERC partially allowed 
construction to resume. When construction was reauthorized, the FERC felt finishing the project 
“as quickly as possible” would be best for the environment and that the route was no longer in 
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question because of the BLM’s supplemental analysis.167 The FERC’s reasoning here further 
confirms the FERC’s preference for speedy completion of projects, whether that is consistent 
with the public interest or not (reaffirming H2 on the FERC deviating from the public interest).  
At the same time, the MVP had to obtain an endangered species consultation from the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) under section 7 of the Endangered Species Act which 
appeared in good standing until the FERC asked the USFWS to look at the consultation again in 
late August 2019 likely in response to a legal challenge the Sierra Club filed weeks prior.168 
Soon after, the court granted a stay of opinion for the original USFWS 2017 Biological Opinion 
and Incidental Take Statement under the ESA in October 2019.169 This halted construction in 
areas affected by the opinion and required re-consultation between the FERC and the USFWS. In 
an interview, John Schmidt, a former regulator from the West Virginia Field Office of the 
USFWS, indicated that this type of stay is uncommon.170 The FERC then issued a halt work 
order four days later.171  
In September 2020, the ESA re-consultation was completed, and the opinion was sent to 
the FERC which prompted the environmental groups to launch another lawsuit and the MVP to 
ask for the authority to resume construction with the permitting updates.172,173 The MVP 
described that allowing construction to continue was better for the environment and 
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landowners.174 At the same time, environmental groups had also recently filed a joint comment 
asking the FERC to prepare a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement because the 
circumstances for the project had changed and more information about the environmental effects 
of the project had been revealed.175 The Sierra Club filed a comment in response to the MVP’s 
request saying that the FERC could not allow construction to resume while the permits from the 
BLM were pending, the MVP was not correct in saying construction was the best for the 
environment, and the FERC had to consider public health concerns with reauthorizing the 
construction. The Sierra Club referenced a case from the ACP where the court wrote, “FERC’s 
authorization for [Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC (ACP)] to begin construction is conditioned on 
the existence of valid authorizations from both FWS and NPS. Absent such authorizations, ACP, 
should it continue to proceed with construction, would violate FERC’s certificate of public 
convenience and necessity.”176 These comments were rooted in Environmental Condition 9 of 
the CPCN, which requires pipelines to have all their permits before beginning construction. 
On October 9, 2020, the FERC issued an unprecedented order partially lifting its previous 
halt work order in response to the MVP’s request.177 The FERC’s decision is unprecedented 
because as Chairman Glick’s office confirmed in an interview, the FERC has never grappled 
with Environmental Condition 9 of the Certificate Order on a pipeline case before.178 In this 
situation, the FERC wrote that the MVP satisfied the Environmental Condition 9 of the CPCN 
when the MVP obtained permits in 2018 before starting construction and when permits are 
suspended, the FERC evaluates the current situation to see what protects the environment. The 
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FERC also disagreed that authorizing construction to resume would limit the BLM’s decision on 
the pending BLM permit, because the BLM had indicated it intended to authorize the same route. 
Commissioner Glick dissented on this decision, questioning why the Environmental Condition 9 
for the permits would only apply the first time a pipeline is approved and if that were true, why 
that would make sense. Commissioner Glick described that agencies and the MVP were 
authorized to stabilize, which would meet landowners’ requests. Commissioner Glick closed 
with, “Today’s order, however, fails to wrestle with the uncertainty created by the outstanding 
permits, not to mention the litigation that is likely to follow, and instead rushes to recommence 
construction. That is not, in my view, a reasoned application of our responsibility to the public 
interest.”179 The FERC’s decision to allow the MVP to resume without a permit and to interpret 
Environmental Condition 9 in this manner is an indication of how the FERC favors the 
industry’s interest (H2), the industry exercises some influence over the FERC (H3), the FERC 
weighs voices from the industry more (H3-b), and the FERC corrodes legislation (H4). 
Later in December 2020, the FERC issued a second order partially lifting the stop work 
orders around JNF. At the time, the FERC authorized construction before the USDA Forest 
Service and BLM, the permitting agencies for the JNF, reauthorized it.180,181 The FERC’s 
decision relied in part on the MVP’s supplemental filing on why it felt the exclusion zone should 
be reduced. As a result, the FERC felt that the project would not contribute the environmental 
problems the FERC thought about earlier. Several commenters were not in favor of reducing the 
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exclusion zone, but the FERC had previously decided that finishing the pipeline and doing final 
restoration would be the best for the environment. Commissioner Glick again dissented, writing 
that the MVP should not be allowed to conduct “piece-meal construction” that affects a national 
forest without all the necessary permits and that the decision was inconsistent with the public 
interest.182 Two months later, the FERC denied rehearing on the order.183,184 The decisions again 
demonstrated a preference for fast construction and reliance on the MVP’s information, 
reaffirming the hypotheses on favoring the industry (H2), the industry exercising some influence 
over the FERC (H3), the FERC experiencing cultural capture (H3-b) and corrosive capture (H4).  
Both of the FERC’s decisions to lift the halt-work orders in October 2020 and December 
2020 are smoking-gun tests which collectively confirm cultural and corrosive capture. The 
FERC’s reasoning process elucidates how the FERC relies on the industry’s information and 
subsequently favors the industry. Leaning into the industry’s information and giving it undue 
weight is precarious and has the potential for major outcomes, such as letting a pipeline finish 
construction. Furthermore, the FERC’s surprising interpretation of Environmental Condition 9 
exposes how the FERC can prioritize the industry’s interest even when other options such as 
mitigation are present, and how the FERC can do so at the expense of Congress’ intent.  
The last smoking-gun test is the FERC’s decision to extend the MVP’s certificate, which 
the hypotheses on the public and private interests diverging (H1), the FERC favoring the 
industry’s interest (H2), the industry influencing the FERC (H3), cultural capture (H3-b), and 
corrosive capture (H4) pass. In August 2020, the MVP requested that the FERC extend its CPCN 
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until 2022 to allow it to finish the pipeline. Subsequently, the FERC conducted a 15-day 
comment period and over 43,000 objections from environmental groups and their members were 
sent to the FERC.185,186,187 Following, the FERC issued the order granting the extension on 
October 9, 2020.  
The FERC’s order is demonstrative of cultural and corrosive capture for several reasons. 
A compelling point is that the FERC appears to again be influenced by the MVP and industry 
over the public in the most striking example yet (MVP vs. 43,000 comments). The FERC’s 
decision to go against the comments is surprising, because as Jennifer Fordham, a former Senior 
Vice President of Government Affairs for the Natural Gas Supply Association (NGSA), 
explained, she would read every comment in her role and the FERC likely does the same.188 
Moreover, the FERC decides to extend the CPCN on the basis that extending construction was 
with precedent and would be best for the environment given that more than 85% of the pipeline 
was done and the compressor stations were complete.189 However, the MVP may not have been 
85% done if the FERC had not stalled legal action with tolling orders. Additionally, interviewees 
in this research disagreed with the 85-90% figure because of the thousands of pending stream 
crossings.190,191,192 Furthermore, the FERC chose to extend the CPCN with awareness of the 
 
185. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC.; Notice of Request for Extension of 
Time,” Federal Register, (September 2, 2020), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/09/02/2020-
19376/mountain-valley-pipeline-llc-notice-of-request-for-extension-of-time  
186. Ridder, Kevin, “Mountain Valley Pipeline Construction Partially Resumes,” Appalachian Voices, (2020), 
https://appvoices.org/2020/10/21/mountain-valley-pipeline-construction-partially-resumes/  
187. Environmental journalist in discussion with the author, February 2021. 
188. Jennifer Fordham in discussion with the author, February 2021. 
189. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Order Granting Requests for Extension of Time,” Docket Nos. 
CP16-10-006, CP16-13-000, (Order, Washington, D.C, October 9, 2020). 
190. Maury Johnson in discussion with the author, February 2021.  
191. Environmental attorneys in discussion with the author, February & March 2021. 





environmental harms that the MVP had caused such as compliance problems with sediment and 
erosion.  
When the FERC goes against the public’s comments, uses the completion as a basis for 
extension, and ignores new evidence of environmental harm, it becomes likely that the FERC is 
safeguarding its previous decision to grant the original CPCN. After all, if three years brought 
significant legal costs and turmoil, it could be considered a waste to stop the pipeline from 
having enough time to finish. This perception could come both from within the FERC or from 
the MVP, who has reported the project was initially estimated to cost around $4 billion and now 
the costs have neared around $6 billion.193 The interpretation that the FERC appears to be 
protecting its original decision to grant the CPCN is also supported by the FERC’s denying new 
intervening requests from landowners, which contrasts with how the FERC previously made 
exceptions such as for ICG Eastern to intervene late on the original CPCN. Thus, the FERC’s 
extension of the CPCN against the public interest exhibits how the public and private interests 
diverge (H1), the FERC favors the industry’s interests (H2), the industry influences the FERC 
(H3), and the FERC is culturally and corrosively captured (H3-b & H4, respectively).  
In sum, the hoop, straw-in-the-wind, and smoking-gun tests throughout the MVP case 
confirm the FERC’s regulatory agency capture. There is evidence that the public and private 
interests diverge (H1), the FERC consistently favors the MVP over the public interest (H2), the 
FERC is influenced by the MVP (H3), the FERC weighs voices from the industry more (H3-b), 
and the FERC corrodes the NGA or NGPA (H4). In contrast, there is no evidence of material 
capture (H3-a). 
 





V. Natural Gas Pipeline Regulatory History 
After finding evidence of cultural and corrosive capture on the MVP case, this paper 
followed Carpenter & Moss’ recommendation of finding when and where the policy shift 
towards the industry occurs.  
Natural gas pipeline regulation began with the Federal Power Commission (FPC) in the 
New Deal Era. The FPC was given the role of natural gas pipeline regulation via The Natural 
Gas Act (NGA) in 1938, which introduced the concept that to build an interstate pipeline a 
company had to receive the CPCN.194 However, the FPC suffered from several issues when it 
began this immense responsibility. First, it had only recently undergone massive changes with 
the Federal Power Act and had several administrative inadequacies prior to that in its youthful 
stage.195 Furthermore, Congress gave the FPC weak authority and a vague legislative agenda, 
leading to the FPC’s agency decay as Bernstein described.196 The FPC’s administrative and 
jurisdictional problems coupled with the necessity for natural gas regulation began the FPC’s 
decline towards cultural capture.197 
For example, Congress gave the FPC little direction on how to decide who to issue a 
CPCN to. CPCNs were used in other utilities and interstate railroads, so Congress may have 
expected the FPC to define the CPCN.198 Furthermore, the FPC lacked jurisdiction in applying 
the CPCN, such as to review the end-use of gas. In 1939, the FPC noted that “it would appear 
that Congress did not intend this Commission generally to weigh the broad social and economic 
effects of the use of various fuels” and in the FPC’s Twentieth Annual Report, the FPC stated 
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that the NGA should be “immediately broadened to give the Commission power to resolve them 
in the public interest.”199 The FPC also noted it had to decide whether it had jurisdiction on each 
case and could not carry out “any serious effort” to conserve natural gas as such.200 Amendments 
followed, and by 1944, the FPC was buying into the coal industry’s arguments about considering 
the end-use of gas. The FPC concluded end-use should be considered after the coal industry 
argued that gas should be used for superior and not for inferior uses, such as for boiler-fuel. The 
coal industry’s policy would result in less natural gas usage; in fact, nearly 55% of natural gas 
consumption in the 1960s on average was for boiler fuel.201,202 The FPC soon applied the coal 
industry’s argument when it rejected an application for a certificate because of the “rapid rate of 
depletion” (of natural gases).203,204  Furthermore, the FPC openly stated how the coal industry 
intervened on these cases.205  
Soon after, predatory pricing led to a Supreme Court case that gave the FPC the power to 
regulate natural gas prices at the wellhead.206 Following the Supreme Court’s decision, the FPC 
began a series of failed attempts to regulate the wellhead prices and was now burdened by a 
serious administrative backlog. The FPC predicted it would not finish the cases from 1960 until 
2043.207 Congress attempted to pass a deregulation bill under President Eisenhower, but the bill 
 
199. Wheat, “Administration by the Federal Power Commission,” 208. 
200. Wheat, “Administration by the Federal Power Commission,” 197. 
201. Koplin, H.T., “Conservation and Regulation: The Natural Gas Allocation Policy of the Federal Power 
Commission,” The Yale Law Journal, 1955: 840-862. 
202. MacAvoy, Paul Webster, & Pindyck, Robert S., The Economics of the Natural Gas Shortage (1960-1980), 
(Cambridge: MIT Energy Laboratory, 1974). 
203. Wheat, “Administration by the Federal Power Commission,” 194-216. 
204. Koplin, “Conservation and Regulation,” 840-862. 
205. Federal Power Commission, “United States. Federal Power Commission Opinions and Decisions of the Federal 
Power Commission: Volume 3,” (Archive, Washington, D.C, 1944). 
206. Raley, David, "The Philips vs. Wisconsin Decision and the Decline of Regulatory Effectiveness," Business 
History Conference. Business and Economic History On-line: Papers Presented at the BHC Annual Meeting, vol. 
15, (2017): 1-11.  
207. MacAvoy, Paul Webster, & Pindyck, Robert S., The Economics of the Natural Gas Shortage (1960-1980), 
(Cambridge: MIT Energy Laboratory, 1974). 
 
 49 
was hindered by a senator who claimed a Superior Oil Company attorney had offered him $2,500 
for his campaign to vote for deregulation. President Eisenhower then vetoed the bill during the 
election year due to the image of corruption (1956).208 The FPC then attempted a series of 
wellhead price controls, some of which backfired and allowed natural gas producing companies 
to have higher prices than before the regulation. Other pricing regulations such as regional 
ceilings seemed more successful.209  
Soon, the FPC decided to “hold the line” on price increases in the 1960s.210 Holding the 
line led the natural gas supply to dwindle, causing a shortage for nearly the next twenty years. 
The shortage occurred when there were less findings of new sources of natural gas as compared 
to the reserve amounts the pipeline companies dedicated to their buyers. Additionally, because 
the reserves existed, the natural gas shortage was not noticed for some time. Without new 
reserves from the natural gas producers, pipelines lessened the backing on each delivery of gas 
and kept taking on new customers to whom they sold gas solely from the reserves. New 
customers saw price hikes while old customers had lower prices and entire market areas lost 
service and were told to use oil instead of gas.211,212 
By 1974, the FPC was dealing with the shortage and the Arab oil embargo, causing it to 
switch to national price ceilings which doubled the prices from the 1960s. At the same time, calls 
were made for either increasing regulation or absolving the FPC’s control on natural gas prices. 
Meanwhile, pipelines continued to move into intrastate markets which the FPC did not 
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regulate.213,214 The gas shortage also put substantial pressure on Congress, who had to either 
regulate intrastate prices or raise prices in interstate markets and who in turn, could have 
pressured the FPC more. By 1973, residential prices were skyrocketing, and consumers were 
putting the pressure on Congress as well (see figure 8).215 The pressure the natural gas crisis put 
on the FPC and Congress introduces a hypothesis regarding when the FPC became captured – if 
the FPC was criticized for its previous anti-industry policies and faced enormous pressure to 
solve the natural gas crisis, it may have adopted a pro-industry stance as a result.  
 
Fig. 8 – Natural gas prices from 1947 to 1977. Figure Source: U.S. Department of Energy 
(1977).216 
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 Following, in 1977, the FPC was consolidated into the FERC which had many of the 
same authorities, but the FERC lost the FPC’s regulatory authority over imports and exports of 
natural gas.217 A year later, Congress passed the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA) in 1978 which 
was considered a landmark for its difficult passage. This resulted in changed pricing regulation 
for new gas at the wellhead and deregulating existing gas prices by 1985. Congress also made a 
major change in regulating that natural gas supplies would first go to residential consumers and 
then to industrial consumers.218 One of the major components of the NGPA was the classifying 
of natural gas into thirty categories that helped to classify what pricing regulations each type of 
gas received to determine its phased pricing deregulation.219 The NGPA ended the shortage for 
many reasons, but one commonly cited reason is that the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) prices rose preceding the NGPA, causing intrastate natural gas prices to rise 
and in turn, for the natural gas producers to discover new sources of natural gas. Though, it is not 
clear that Congress predicted the shortage was on its way out. Congress believed deregulation 
was needed to clear the gas shortage by 1985 in part because of the help it received from industry 
experts. The Department of Energy predicted that without the NGPA, there would be excess 
demand of 5% in 1958 and that the residential gas price would increase six percent every year 
from 1978 to 1985. In contrast, the American Gas Association predicted a 4x excess demand in 
1977 as compared to the Department of Energy prediction and the Association also predicted that 
supply would not meet demand with the NGPA.220  
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Congress could have tried to solve the gas shortage with alternatives, such as regulating 
pipelines in the intrastate markets the same way as interstate pipelines or regulating the fuel oil 
price (which is directly related to the pricing of natural gas).221 Despite these alternatives, 
Congress followed the industry’s data and chose residential consumers over industrial, likely 
placing some pressure on the new FERC to ensure a natural gas shortage does not occur again.222 
Because Congress took their cues from the industry and public and the FERC had little role in 
the decision-making, the NGPA begins to suggest “electorally sanctioned pro-business 
governance” or when Congress and the people ask the FERC to adopt a pro-industry stance.223  
After the NGPA, the new and high-cost gas producers were able to charge high rates 
while old gas was undervalued and left in the ground.224 Pipelines were also forced to purchase 
expensive gas because they had signed long-term contracts during the natural gas crisis. These 
higher prices and a dip in oil prices then led the gas demand to drop during the 1980s, amidst a 
nationwide recession. As a result, pipelines were stuck with gas they had paid high prices to the 
producers for but could not charge consumers high prices for (causing market oversupply or the 
bubble). Pipelines could also not transport other cheaper natural gas because of their contracts 
from the crisis. The FERC responded by removing the price ceiling on the old gas and adding a 
uniform price ceiling for all gas from after 1974 and the FERC also allowed for pipelines and 
producers to renegotiate these contracts.225  
Soon, the FERC faced its first major regulatory challenge. The bubble caused customers 
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unbundle gas and buy gas directly from the producers and buy the transport from the pipelines. 
As a result, pipelines made a new type of package called Special Marketing Programs (SMPs) 
where the customer could buy their own gas from the manufacturer of the gas and then buy the 
transport from the pipeline.226 Soon after, the FERC leaned into the industry’s practices and 
codified SMPs with Order. No 436 and Order No. 636, which strongly suggests cultural capture.  
Order No. 436 was originally intended to resolve gas customer discrimination, but the 
order received much pushback because it followed a first-come first-serve standard which could 
still preference customers with more resources.227,228 Order No. 436 was also a turning point in 
the FERC’s regulation of CPCNs for pipelines. At a time of gas surplus and falling prices, the 
FERC chose to offer “optional, expedited certificates.”229,230 These “blanket certificates” let the 
pipelines transport gas without “prior authorization” from the FERC as long as the pipeline 
company took on all the risk for the pipeline.231 A Government Accountability Office report 
stated that a goal of the order was to, “allow pipelines and other eligible applicants to obtain 
section 7 certification more quickly and easily than normal when offering new services…”232 In 
1987, 26 of the major 45 pipeline companies were participating in the program (~58%) and some 
of the others who did not participate said that the program would “not be beneficial.”233 Others 
were concerned about the new certificate program. Commenters wrote that the Commission was 
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presuming that the NGA requirements would be met because the pipeline was taking on the 
financial risk of the pipeline and so, the pipeline companies should either have to go through the 
full NGA hearing or provide proof the pipeline was in the public interest.234 The order was 
challenged, but the courts upheld that the FERC had the authority to give the expedited 
certificates.235  
Pipelines were not originally obligated to comply with the order to unbundle, but in 1992, 
FERC Order No. 636 made the unbundling of the sale of gas and the sale of the transportation 
service mandatory and implemented other pricing changes.236,237 Previous work analyzing the 
comments submitted at the time indicates the FERC chose the pipelines and customers to side 
with over distributors, suggesting capture.238  Distributors were not happy with either order or 
SMPs, as their role for gas sales became nearly obsolete at least with large industrial consumers 
and it could lead to interrupted service for customers. However, distributors could not argue that 
the new SMPs were not in the public interest, because there were no standards for this and the 
SMPs saved industrial consumers money.239  
By 1989, all regions of the country were connected by a natural gas pipeline and natural 
gas wellhead price controls virtually ended.240,241 Following this long period of blanket 
certification from Order No. 436 for approving pipelines after the natural gas bubble, the FERC 
started to change the certificate process again in 1991 by adding a burden to recover projects 
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costs on the new pipeline and not the existing pipeline customers for all pipelines.242 In 1999, the 
FERC produced its final natural gas pipeline policy statement in an echo chamber of industry 
voices.  
In the public comment period, the FERC asked stakeholders to comment on three options 
for policies – “for the Commission to authorize all applications that at a minimum meet the 
regulatory requirements, then let the market pick winners and losers. Another would be for the 
Commission to select a single project to serve a given market and exclude all other competitors. 
Another possible option would be for the Commission to approve an environmentally acceptable 
right-of-way and let potential builders compete for a certificate.”243 The FERC did not post how 
many comments they received for the 1999 policy in the final statement of policy, but a search of 
the FERC eLibrary revealed 232 comments were filed under both docket numbers in the 
category “Comments/Protest” from 01/01/1998 to 01/01/2001. The American Gas Association 
submitted a comment summarizing the >100 comments the FERC had received by that point and 
offering recommendations for the FERC to implement. For example, the American Gas 
Association summarized a framework that fosters competitive markets, allowing customers to 
choose negotiated services and pipelines implement tariffs to protect customers if customers 
subsidize the negotiated services.244 Likewise, the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America 
filed a comment, also submitting policy recommendations for pricing changes.245 These 
comments from two of the biggest conglomerations of stakeholders did not specifically mention 
the CPCN process. This was a surprising revelation, because the FERC policy posted in 1999 
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explained the goal of the policy was to “foster competitive markets, protect captive customers, 
and avoid unnecessary environmental and community impacts while serving increasing demands 
for natural gas.”246 The absence of the CPCN in the comments could indicate the expectation for 
loose application of the concept of public convenience and necessity.  
Ultimately, the FERC decided to approve those who can meet the NGA criteria so the 
market can decide which projects should be implemented. Under the new regulatory regime, the 
process to grant the certificate involves a predicate test of proving a market need. From there, the 
FERC moves onto assessing the public benefit and impact before granting the certificate.247 In 
deciding this policy, the FERC also weighed concerns like overbuilding and shortages, but 
ultimately went for a market-based approach. Some argue that the FERC policy of letting the 
market pick the winners and losers works well, allowing for self-selected applicants to apply and 
receive the FERC’s high rate of approval. For example, the Pacific Connector was not originally 
approved by the FERC because it provided little proof it was needed without any contracts, 
precedent agreements, or an open season.248 Though, some projects do not fit this theory. For 
example, the Atlantic Coast Pipeline was a highly risky project traversing the Appalachian Trail 
and ultimately became a sunk cost.249  
It is probable that the FERC was receiving comments in an industry echo chamber in 
1999 who wanted a free natural gas market after the failed regulation of the 1950s. Though no 
environmentalists’ comments were found on the 1999 policy from the comment period, some 
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later comments revealed concern existed for the predicate market test. The Defenders of 
Wildlife, National Audubon Society, and National Wildlife Refuge Association sent a joint letter 
writing that the “In our view, the Commission should not make an evaluation based only on 
economic calculation and dismiss permanent environmental change.”250 Moreover, when the 
1999 policy was published, the FERC had already set a precedent for a relaxed regulatory state 
from Order No. 436 and Order No. 636.  
Evaluating regulatory history of the FPC and FERC reveals a troubled record of natural 
gas pipeline certification. The FPC began with a period of confusion and lack of jurisdiction, 
then inadvertently contributed to a natural gas crisis. After the NGPA, the FERC then begins to 
demonstrate symptoms of cultural capture and corrosive capture when it codified industry 
actions and removed the necessary certificate proceedings. Ultimately, the FERC settled on the 
1999 policy in what could be coincidental cultural capture at a time when no one opposed natural 
gas and no one outside of the industry commented on the policy before it was set. Though these 
seem like accidents, it is unclear why the FERC has remained glued to the 1999 pro-industry 
policy for twenty years. In sum, the analysis suggests that the FPC and FERC gradually became 
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 Confirming capture drives a regulatory outcome over other causes is challenging. Though 
this paper suggests that the FERC is culturally and corrosively captured, it also finds several 
confounding variables and potential other sources of capture because the FERC did not approve 
the MVP in a vacuum.  
To illustrate, agencies are prime targets for capture by the industries they regulate. The 
agencies the FERC works with, like the USACE and BLM, were criticized for their permitting 
errors and inadequate analyses by the courts, which could suggest they have already been 
captured. Like these agencies, the state agencies that the FERC works with such as the West 
Virginia Department of Environmental Protection and Virginia Department of Environmental 
Quality can become captured by pro-industry ideology from the industry. These state agencies 
are also uniquely vulnerable to “electorally sanctioned pro-business governance,” because the 
revenues and jobs from big projects can cause elected state and local officials to persuade 
regulatory decision makers.251 
Furthermore, the FERC’s agenda can stem from Congress or the Executive. The FERC is 
intended to be an independent agency, but the FERC derives its power and funding from 
Congress and an agenda from the Executive. For example, the Trump administration was 
reported to pressure agencies with its pro-energy stance on the Atlantic Coast Pipeline.252 John 
Schmidt, a former regulator with the USFWS, also described that the Trump administration did 
not operate like previous administrations.253 Likewise, Congress, the Executive, and the 
bureaucracy are also influenced by public opinion. If the public opinion in any constituency 
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supports pipelines, the FERC can conduct “electorally sanctioned pro-business governance” 
where it favors the industry because the constituency desires that.254  
Furthermore, Carpenter & Moss’ gold-standard for diagnosing capture emphasizes how a 
solid capture diagnosis must “Show action and intent by the industry (special interest) in pursuit 
of this policy shift sufficiently effective to have plausibly caused an appreciable part of the 
shift.”255 Though this study points to areas where the MVP appears to have influenced the FERC, 
the unwritten conversations between the MVP and the FERC are not revealed. However, a study 
of capture rarely finds a “eureka” piece of evidence such as a link between the regulator and the 
industry that can prove capture. Further analysis via FOIA requests may indicate more evidence 
of capture in the future to better meet this standard set by Carpenter & Moss. 
Additionally, this study’s findings are confounded by the FERC’s own procedural errors 
and institutional justice concerns. Several parts of this study find errors in the FERC’s process 
such as tolling orders, which suggest capture due to how these errors favor the industry. 
However, it is also possible that the FERC conducts a poor public participation process on its 
own. For example, an investigation by the Office of the Inspector General on the FERC revealed 
the FERC did not post Notices of Schedule for Environmental Review for 9 years, including a 
period where the MVP was considered.256 During interviews, several participants raised similar 
concerns. A journalist brought up that several people they met did not have internet access and 
missed big updates that otherwise were not on the front of the news.257 Walker from the Sierra 
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Club also explained that in her experience at the Sierra Club, “Of all agencies, FERC is the 
absolute worst in terms of public participation.”258  
Lastly, this study’s findings may not be representative of the FERC’s actions on other 
pipeline cases. The MVP and ACP are unique cases due to the level of pushback and how the 
opposition succeeded.259 The level of permitting errors is unprecedented to this research’s 
knowledge and as Chairman Glick’s office confirmed, no one opposed pipelines like this 
before.260 Although the MVP may not entirely represent the FERC’s experiences with pipelines, 
it is an indication of how pipeline permitting may go with the new pipelines intended in 
Appalachia. 
Though there are other explanations for the FERC’s pattern of decision-making and 
confounding variables are present in the study, this paper nevertheless posits the FERC is 
culturally and corrosively captured. The FERC’s nearly universal record of decision-making 
against the public interest is difficult to explain via other means, and there are numerous 
instances where the FERC should have been making decisions insulated from congressional or 
Executive influence but still chose to favor the MVP. Therefore, the evidence at hand points to 
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In Alleghany Defense Project v. FERC, Judge Griffith wrote,  
“One cannot review the procedural history of this case, and others like it, without 
concluding that something is amiss. Landowners watch as their property is handed over 
to pipeline companies and irreparably transformed, all without judicial consideration of 
the crucial question: Should the pipeline exist?”261 
 
 Reviewing the MVP’s regulatory history, a similar sentiment pervades the case – 
“something is amiss.”262 Since the MVP was approved by the FERC, it has encountered infinite 
litigation and controversy. At the same time, a nearly universal chorus of participants charges the 
FERC with regulatory capture and argues the MVP should not have been granted a certificate to 
begin with. Taking their claims into consideration, this research sought to substantiate or debunk 
the claim of capture. 
 In process-tracing the MVP’s path to-date, this research found that the FERC 
demonstrated cultural and corrosive capture. The FERC first approved the MVP with a CPCN 
when it had no conclusive evidence the MVP was necessary and it had significant evidence the 
MVP will harm the public. Furthermore, the FERC ceded to the MVP several times during the 
environmental analysis to provide the CPCN, suggesting cultural and corrosive capture. The 
FERC then corroded the intent of Congress by issuing tolling orders for six months and 
interpreting Environmental Condition 9 to mean permits are only necessary at the start of 
construction and not throughout construction, providing evidence of corrosive capture. The 
cultural and corrosive capture are deemed weak by this research because though the FERC is 
captured, it does useful environmental mitigation and a free-for-all on natural gas pipelines can 
lead to overbuilding and resource sacrifice zones. Although other confounding factors exist for 
 




the hypothesis of capture, the FERC demonstrates an undeniable record of favoring the MVP and 
energy industry on the MVP case and over the past twenty years.263  
 To understand where this capture started, this paper investigated where the FPC or FERC 
began leaning into the industry. The history exhibited that the FPC began with vague and weak 
powers, which contributed to the natural gas crisis. The nascent FERC then began regulating in 
crisis mode, trying to reverse course from the FPC’s pricing problems and leaning too far into 
the industry’s practices as evidenced by the FERC codifying the industry’s practices such as 
unbundling gas and transport. This paper surmises that low levels of cultural capture began with 
the FPC in 1938 but grew most obviously and dangerously after the natural gas crisis and the 
NGPA in 1978 when the FERC began a practice of following the industry’s lead at the expense 
of environmental laws and landowners.  
The bulk of this research on the MVP and FERC also suggests that the FERC has 
remained glued to its deleterious and outdated 1999 policy for twenty years with little rationale. 
This old-fashioned policy has justified many of the FERC’s missteps on the MVP, such as using 
the specious affiliate contracts to demonstrate economic need and weighing economic need as a 
predicate test before public harm. It is promising that the FERC is now considering changing the 
1999 policy. In both 2018 and 2021, the FERC opened inquiries into changing the policy with 
mention of considering climate change and environmental justice.264 Chairman Glick also now 
plans to open an Office of Public Participation as the Federal Power Act intended, which can 
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potentially alleviate some cultural capture.265 As Commissioner Glick notes, “Time and time 
again, landowners do their very best to navigate the complexity of FERC proceedings. And, time 
and time again, the Commission relies on technicalities to prevent them from even having the 
opportunity to vindicate their interests.”266 In theory, dampening public comment allows the 
FERC to fall deeper into cultural capture because the industry voices are heard more and the 
Office of Public Participation may begin to remedy that problem. Likewise, Congress has also 
recently indicated changes to policies which could prevent the FERC from steamrolling another 
large natural gas pipeline like the MVP. Congress is now considering the Energy Act of 2020 
and with the new Congress, President Biden may also champion a green energy agenda. 
 Still, these changes leave room for capture to drive regulatory outcomes. Congress’ 
previous attempts to solve capture put the public into the agency’s process by adding public 
comment and the power to go to court. However, public comment has been inefficient and 
confusing for landowners, and court decisions have produced a ‘start-stop’ pattern of 
construction which tremendously increased project costs. Modern attempts to stop capture should 
distance the regulator from the industry it regulates, give the regulator a more specific mandate, 
improve public participation, and have more regulatory oversight.267 These are ambitious goals, 
but changes like expanding the comment period, making public meetings more accessible, 
adding more agency representatives to meetings, revising the NGPA of 1978, and putting an 
intermediary between the FERC and companies could help to improve the capture the FERC 
currently faces.  
 
265. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Workshop Regarding the Creation of the Office of Public 
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As Samuel Huntington wrote in 1952, “Successful adaptation to changing environmental 
circumstances is the secret of health and longevity for administrative as well as biological 
organisms. Every government agency must reflect to some degree the ‘felt needs’ of its time.”268 
Future research into confirming this diagnosis of capture and defining the mechanism of capture 
within the FERC is needed. However, the FERC is at an undeniable crossroads of the private and 
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Appendix A - Interviewee List 
 
1. A journalist in Virginia 
2. An environmental journalist 
3. An environmental attorney* 
4. An environmental attorney* 
5. An environmental attorney* 
6. Joan Walker: Senior Campaign Representative, Beyond Dirty Fuels Campaign, Sierra 
Club 
7. David Sligh: Conservation Director, Wild Virginia 
8. Jennifer Fordham: Former Senior Vice President of Government Affairs for the Natural 
Gas Supply Association (NGSA) 
9. Colin Rees: Senior Campaigner at Oil Change International 
10. John Schmidt: Former regulator with the USFWS 
11. David Perry: Executive Director, Blue Ridge Land Conservancy & member of the 
Roanoke Pipeline Advisory Committee 
12. Maury Johnson: Affected landowner, Executive Committee Member of Protect Our 
Water, Heritage, Rights, and Executive Committee Member at Preserve Monroe  
13. Ken Ward: Journalist with ProPublica 
14. Chairman Glick’s Office (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) 
 


























Appendix B - Pipeline Route269 
1. The MVP begins at an interconnection with an Equitrans’ pipeline in Wetzel County, 
West Virginia. 
2. From there, the pipeline heads southeast to Wallace in Harrison County, West Virginia 
and then Salem in Harrison County, West Virginia.  
3. The pipeline then moves south between the towns of Webster Springs and Tigoa in 
Webster County and Nicholas County, West Virginia respectively. 
4. From there, the pipeline turns southwest and past Pence in Summers County, West 
Virginia and Greenville in Monroe County, West Virginia.  
5. Next, for 1.6 miles, the pipeline covers Jefferson National Forest. The 1.6 miles includes 
crossing the Appalachian National Scenic Trail. This 1.6 mile area across Jefferson 
National Forest is just northwest of Goldbond in Giles County, Virginia.  
6. From there, the pipeline meets an Appalachian Power Company (AEP) transmission line 
west of Kimbleton in Giles County, Virginia.  
7. After that, the pipeline moves northeast of Newport in Giles County, Virginia. 
8. Next, the pipeline heads southeast and covers Jefferson National Forest again. 
9. Following, the pipeline moves south and colocates with the AEP transmission line again 
and then crosses Interstate 81. 
10. Subsequently, the pipeline continues south and passes the Spring Hollow Reservoir. 
11. Then, the pipeline moves southeast and passes west of the town Bent Mountain in 
Roanoke County, Virginia. 
12. The pipeline next moves east, where it passes the Blue Ridge Parkway. 
13. From there, the pipeline moves east to the towns of Boones Mill and Rocky Mount in 
Franklin County, Virginia  
14. Lastly, the pipeline moves southeast until it terminates at Transco’s Zone 5 Compressor 
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